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We present a solution to an old and timely problem in dis-
tributed computing. Like Quantum Key Distribution (QKD),
quantum channels make it possible to achieve taks classically
impossible. However, unlike QKD, here the goal is not se-
crecy but agreement, and the adversary is not outside but
inside the game, and the resources require qutrits.
Entanglement is a resource that allows quantum
physics to perform tasks that are classically impossible.
This is the new leitmotif of quantum information pro-
cessing. The best known examples are quantum cryptog-
raphy [1,2] and Shor’s algorithm to efficiently factorize
large numbers [3]. There are numerous other examples,
but admittedly many of them look quite artificial. This
can be understood by the fact that the field is rather
young and one has to learn to think about problems
in a completely new way. In this letter we consider an
old information-theoretical problem in the field of fault-
tolerant distributed computing, known as the Byzantine
agreement problem [4] and present a solution which ex-
ploits entanglement between three qutrits (i.e., three 3-
dimensional quantum systems).
Imagine that several divisions of the Byzantine army
are camped outside an enemy city, each division com-
manded by its own general. The generals can communi-
cate with one another only by messengers. One of the
generals, the commanding general, after observing the
enemy, must decide on a plan of action and communicate
it to the other generals. However, some of the generals
(especially the commanding general himself) might be
traitors, trying to prevent the loyal generals from reach-
ing agreement on the plan of action. The question hence
is whether there is a protocol among the generals that,
after its termination, satisfies the following conditions:
1. All loyal generals agree on a common plan of action.
2. If the commanding general is loyal, then all loyal
generals agree on the commanding general’s plan.
More precisely we define Byzantine agreement (shortly
broadcast) as follows.
Definition 1: A protocol among n players such that
one distinct player S (the sender) holds an input value
xS ∈ D (for some finite domain D) and all other players
(the receivers) eventually decide on an output value in
D is said to achieve broadcast if the protocol guarantees
that all honest players decide on the same output value
y ∈ D and that y = xS whenever the sender is honest.
In modern terms, this problem concerns coordination
in distributed computing (among several processors or
computers) where some of the processors might fail. For
example, a database can be replicated among several
servers in order to guarantee access to the database even
if some of the servers misbehave. Nevertheless, an in-
consistent external update of the database must result in
all honest servers having exactly the same views on the
database. Consider for instance that the database con-
tains the price of valuable goods, or currency exchange
rates. It is then important that no adversary, not even
an inside adversary, can affect the coordination in such
a way that the prices would be low somewhere and high
elsewhere.
The broadcast problem has been considered in a vast
literature and has developed several variations [4]. Here
we shall define the problem more precisely as follows.
Three players are connected by pairwise authenticated
classical and quantum channels, see Fig. 1. For simplic-
ity, we assume the channels to be error free — generally,
errors would have to be additionally dealt with by means
of error correction codes. The general purpose is that one
of the players, namely the sender (S for short), broad-
casts a bit to his two partners, the receiving players R0
and R1. Both receivers should end with the same value.
However, one – and at most one – of the three players
might actually be an active adversary. For instance, a
dishonest sender could send different bit values to R0
and R1. The receivers may realize that there is a prob-
lem simply by exchanging their bits. But then, player R1
cannot conclude whether the sender is dishonest and he
should keep the bit received from R0 or whether player
R0 is cheating and he should keep the bit received from
the sender. It is not too difficult to convince oneself that
because the players have only access to pairwise channels,
this task is not obvious.
If the players have access only to classical pairwise au-
thenticated channels, the broadcast problem is provably
unsolvable [4,5]. This even holds for arbitrary pairwise
communication, i.e., not even quantum channels can help
to solve the problem [6]. However, we shall demonstrate
that the additional resource of the quantum channel al-
lows them to solve a slightly weaker problem, namely de-
tectable broadcast, which is powerful enough for a large
range of applications of this problem.
Definition 2: A protocol among three players such that
one distinct player S (the sender) holds an input value
xS ∈ D (for some finite domain D) and the other two
players (the recipients) eventually decide on an output
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value in D is said to achieve detectable broadcast if the
protocol satisfies the following conditions:
1. If no player is corrupted then the protocol achieves
broadcast.
2. If one or more players are corrupted then either the
protocol achieves broadcast or all honest players
abort the protocol.
Note that detectable broadcast cannot be solved only
with pairwise authenticated classical channels. However,
we demonstrate that pairwise authenticated classical and
quantum channels are sufficient to solve the problem. Ba-
sically, we solve the problem by having the players
1. distribute entanglement,
2. check that the entangled states are not corrupted,
and
3. use them to solve the problem.
At first sight, this sounds very similar to quantum
cryptography. But, actually, it is very different! Indeed,
here we do not require any secrecy: what counts is to
avoid any discord. Also, here, in contrast to quantum
cryptography, the adversary is not an outside player, but
might be anyone among the three players. Finally, here,
the entanglement requires entangled qutrits, contrary to
quantum cryptography where qubits suffice.
The first point of the above program, i.e. distribut-
ing entanglement, is trivial (in theory), since we assume
that quantum channels are available. The testing (i.e. the
second point), however, is tricky. Indeed, the testing re-
quires (classical) communication between the three play-
ers. But the adversary being inside the game could cor-
rupt this communication phase. Especially at the last
round of the communication phase, the adversary could
send contradictory messages to the two honest players.
In other quantum information protocols involving more
than two players, e.g., in quantum secret sharing [7],
this problem is avoided by assuming that the players can
broadcast their (classical) messages. But here broadcast-
ing is not assumed among the primitives, on the contrary,
it is the goal of the game. Below we show how to break
this vicious circle! But first, we need to explain how the
three players can use entangled qutrits to solve the prob-
lem.
Let us assume that the 3 players share many qutrits
triplets Ψj, each in the Aharonov state |A〉:
|A〉 = (|0, 1, 2〉~m + |1, 2, 0〉~m + |2, 0, 1〉~m (1)
− |0, 2, 1〉~m − |1, 0, 2〉~m − |2, 1, 0〉~m
) 1√
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where |0, 1, 2〉~m denotes the tensor product state |0〉~m ⊗
|1〉~m ⊗ |2〉~m. If one identifies qutrits with spin-1 and as-
sociates the state |2〉~m with the eigenvalue −1 of the spin
operator ~m~S, then the Aharonov state is the unique three
spin-1 state of total spin zero. Consequently – and anal-
ogously to the singlet state of qubit pairs – the Aharonov
state is invariant under tri-lateral rotations: it keeps the
same form (1) for all directions ~m, where |0〉~m, |1〉~m and
|2〉~m are the 3 eigenvectors of the spin operator ~m~S. We
shall exploit the fact that whenever the three qutrits are
all measured in the same basis, then all three results dif-
fer.
With the help of this additional resource, i.e., the
Aharonov states, the protocol runs as described below.
At each step we comment on the reasons why this is safe.
Actually, all steps are rather trivial, except the last one
which needs a careful analysis.
1. First, the sender S sends the bit x to be broadcast
to the two receivers R0 and R1, using the classical
channels. Let us denote x0 and x1 the bits received
by R0 and R1, respectively. Next, the Sender S
measures all his qutrits in the z-basis. Whenever
he gets the result x, S sends the index j to both
receivers [8]. Accordingly, the players R0 and R1
receive each a set of indices, J0 and J1, respectively
(label ❤1 on Fig. 1).
2. Both receivers test the consistency of their data.
For this they measure their qutrits in the z-basis.
If all results with indices in Jp differ from xp, then
playerRp has consistent data and he sets a flag yp =
xp. If a set of data is inconsistent, then the player
sets his flag to yp =⊥ (interpreted as inconsistent).
3. The two receivers send their flags to each other. If
both flags agree then the protocol terminates with
all honest players agreeing on x.
4. If yp =⊥, player Rp knows that the sender is dis-
honest. He concludes that the other receiver is hon-
est and he simply accepts the bit he receives from
him (If y0 = y1 =⊥, then they both end with the
”value” ⊥).
5. It remains only the interesting case that both re-
ceivers claim that they received consistent, but dif-
ferent, data. The strategy we propose then is that
player R1 will not change his bit y1, unless player
R0 convinces him that he did indeed receive the bit
y0 from the sender in a consistent way. To convince
his partner of his honesty, player R0 sends him all
the indices k ∈ J0 for which he has the result 1−y0
(label ❤2 on Fig. 1).
6. Receiver R1 now checks that he gets ”enough” in-
dices k from R0 such that
(a) ”almost all [9]” indices k from R0 are not in
R1’s index set J1, and such that
(b) these k indices correspond to qutrits for which
R1’s results are ”almost all” equal 2.
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If R0 indeed got an index set that is consistent with
bit y0 then S holds y0, R0 holds 1− y0, and hence,
R0’s result must be a 2. If the test succeeds, player
R1 changes his bit to y0, otherwise he keeps y1.
Let us examine why player R0 cannot cheat (see Table
1). Assume that R0 receives the bit x0 = 0, but pretends
that he got 1. To convince the receiver R1 to accept
his ”pretended bit”, player R0 must first announce that
he received consistent data (which is true, but with bit
value 0), and next send a sufficiently large set of indices
{k} with almost no intersection with J1 and for which
R1 almost always has the result 2. Since player R0 has
no information on the indices outside J0 for which he
measured 1−y0 (other than 1−y0 itself), approximately
half of the indices that player R1 gets are different from
2 — which is not accepted by player R1.
Let us stress two important features of this protocol.
First, the last player, i.e., player R1, almost never talks
(he only sends his value y1 toR0). Moreover, if the sender
is honest, then the last player never changes his mind.
This is important for the distribution and test phase of
the protocol described below. Second, a third noticeable
point is that our protocol uses trits and not bits. Clearly,
trits can always be encode as 2 bits, like qutrits can be re-
alized as 2-qubit in symmetric states. But fundamentally,
the protocol requires trits (and we convinced ourselves,
but without a proof, that no protocol using intrinsically
only bits exists).
So far we described a protocol assuming that the 3
players share a large collection of qutrit triplets in the
Aharonov state (1). We now describe a protocol to dis-
tribute and test such states. This protocol uses only pair-
wise communication, in particular no broadcasting is as-
sumed. Nevertheless, the protocol has only two possible
outcomes: global success or global failure. By global we
mean that all honest players end with the same conclu-
sion. In case of failure, the broadcasting protocol does
not even start. In case of success, broadcasting can be
realized reliably.
The distribution-&-testing protocol works as follows:
1. Player R1 prepares many qutrit triplets Ψj in the
Aharonov state (1). For each index j he sends one
qutrit to player S and one to R0 (label ❤A on Fig.
1).
2. Both S and R0 check that their qutrits are in the
maximally mixed state. In case of success, they set
a flag fp to 1, else to 0.
3. Player R0 sends a sample of his qutrits to S (label
❤B on Fig. 1). Player S tests that the sample of
qutrit pairs he now holds are in the correct state
[10]:
ρsR0 = Tr,R1(|A〉〈A|) (2)
=
1
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(
P|1,2〉−|2,1〉 + P|2,0〉−|0,2〉 + P|0,1〉−|1,0〉
)
If the test fails, then he sets his flag to 0: fS = 0.
4. Player R1 sends a sample of his qutrits to R0 and
another sample to S. Both R0 and S test their
qutrit pairs as in the previous point 3. If the test
fails they set their flag to 0.
5. Player S and R0 exchange their flag. If a player
receives a 0, then he sets his flag to zero.
6. Both players S and R0 broadcast their flags using
the protocol described previously.
7. Any player with flag 1 who received a 0-flag changes
his flag to 0.
At first, the step 6 of the above protocol seems im-
possible, since the broadcast protocol requires reliable
Aharonov states! Nevertheless, let us look closer at this
step. If player R1 does not produce the correct states,
then, since by assumption there is no more than one dis-
honest player, players S and R0 are honest and both will
end with their flag on failure: fS = fR0 = 0. Let us
thus assume that all states Ψj = |A〉. Consequently, the
broadcasting is reliable. All what a dishonest player S,
R0 or R1 could do is to act in such a way that the flags
are set to 0 [11]. But during the last step of the proto-
col, i.e., the broadcast sessions, both the one initiated by
S and the one initiated by R0 are reliable. Hence it is
impossible that some players end this protocol thinking
that a status of success has been reached, while another
one thinks the opposite. Moreover, if all players agree on
success, then they share Aharonov states and they can
reliably run the broadcast protocol.
The field of quantum communication is still in its in-
fancy. Only very few protocols concern more than two
parties and almost all use qubits. In this letter we pre-
sented a protocol among three players connected by pair-
wise quantum channels able to transmit qutrits and to
preserve their entanglement. The protocol is a version
of the well known Byzantine agreement problem, a very
timely problem in today’s information based society. Ad-
mittedly, the problem has been slightly adapted to fit into
the quantum frame, a natural synergy between classical
and quantum information theories. It is not too difficult
to generalize our result to n players with t < n
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cheaters,
though this is beyond the present letter [12]. One may
question whether the use of qutrits is necessary or not for
broadcasting. Though this is still an open question, it is
clear that the present protocol is intimately related to
the Aharonov state (the natural generalization to three
parties of the well known singlet state of two qubits),
hence to qutrits.
Two other features of our protocol should be men-
tioned. First, the quantum states are used ”only” to
distribute classical private random variables with specific
correlation to the 3 players (a trit per player, each of a
different value, all combination with equal probabilities).
This is similar to quantum cryptography where quantum
3
mechanics ”only” provides key distribution. However,
contrary to the ”one-time-pad” algorithm used in con-
junction with quantum key distribution, the present algo-
rithm was itself inspired by the elegance of the Aharonov
quantum state. Finally, experimental demonstration of
the protocol can be realized with today’s technology, us-
ing photons and 3-paths interferometers. Actually one
would not need to prepare 3 entangled photons, two
would suffice since the preparer R1 could measure his
qutrit immediately, similarly to the demonstration of
quantum secrete sharing using pairs of photons [13].
Work supported by the Swiss Science Foundation.
[1] C. Bennett, G. Brassard, Int. conf. Computers, Systems
& Signal Processing, Bangalore, India, December 10-12,
175-179, 1984.
[2] A. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661, 1991.
[3] P. W. Shor, Proceedings of the 35th Symposium on Foun-
dations of Computer Science, Los Alamitos, edited by
Shafi Goldwasser (IEEE Computer Society Press), 124-
134, 1994.
[4] L. Lamport, R. Shostak, and M. Pease. The Byzantine
generals problem. ACM Transactions on Programming
Languages and Systems, 4(3):382–401, July 1982; and
refs therein.
[5] M. J. Fischer, N. A. Lynch, and M. Merritt. Distributed
Computing, 1:26–39, 1986.
[6] M. Fitzi, J. A. Garay, U. Maurer, and R. Ostrovsky. Ad-
vances in Cryptology - CRYPTO ’01, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, Springer-Verlag. 2001.
[7] M. Hillery, V. Buzek, and A. Berthiaume, Phys. Rev. A
59, 1829, 1999; A. Karlsson, M. Koashi, and N. Imoto.
Phys. Rev. A 59, 162, 1999; R. Cleve, D. Gottesman,
H.-K. Lo, Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 648, 1999.
[8] In practice, it is more realistic to assume that each player
measures all the qutrits in randomly chosen bases. Then,
each time they communicate a trit value, they need to
add the information about the measurement basis, and
each time they receive a trit they ignore it unless it hap-
pens that they measured their corresponding qutrit in
the same basis.
[9] This qualification is needed for statistical tests. In the
limit of arbitrarily many qutrit-triplets, ”almost all”
translates into ”with probability one”.
[10] To see that this test is sufficient to guarantee that the
player R1 who prepared the states can’t cheat, consider
a general purification Ψ of the mixed state ρsR0 . Divid-
ing the three parts into R1 versus the two others, one
can write Ψ in the Schmidt form. Using the fact that
the eigenstates of ρsR0 are the three states |n, n + 1〉 −
|n + 1, n〉, n=0,1,2, one obtains: Ψ = |α0〉 ⊗ (|1, 2〉 −
|2, 1〉) + |α1 > ⊗(|2, 0〉 − |0, 2〉) + |α2〉 ⊗ (|0, 2〉 − |2, 0〉).
Since, by virtue of the Schmidt decomposition the three
states |αn > are mutually orthogonal, this is precisely the
Aharonov state (up to phases that can be changed locally
and do not affect the correlation in the z-basis). An equiv-
alent test can be performed using only local measure-
ments in randomly chosen bases and classical pairewise
communication: S choses the bases and R0 announces
his results.
[11] Similarly to QKD where Eve can block the key distribu-
tion, but not extract information.
[12] M. Fitzi, N. Gisin, U. Maurer, and O. von Rotz. Un-
conditional byzantine agreement and multi-party compu-
tation secure against dishonest minorities from scratch.
Manuscript, 2001.
[13] W. Tittel, N. Gisin and H. Zbinden, Phys. Rev. A 63,
042301, 2001.
FIGURE CAPTIONS
1. Fig 1: Flow of classical (straight lines) and quan-
tum (wavy lines) information. Note that both kinds
of information flow exactly in opposite direction.
This is needed to avoid that the adversary can bring
in confusion at the last communication round.
I II III IV V V I
S 0 0 1 1 2 2
R0 1 2 2 0 0 1
R1 2 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
J0
0 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
J1
1 0
TABLE I. After measuring their qutrits, the sender S and
receivers R1 and R0 results fall into 6 classes, labeled with
Roman numbers. The index-sets J0 and J1 associated to the
bit values 0 and 1 correspond to the labels I,II and III,IV,
respectively. If R0 receives the bit 0 and the set J0 he can
announce to R1 all cases where he has the bit 1: all cases
labeled by I. For all these cases R1 has the value 2. However,
if R0 tries to cheat and pretends to have received a bit 1, then
he can’t differentiate between the cases labeled IV and V. For
the latter, R1 has a value 1, he can thus detect cheating R0.
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